Eyewitnesses and local sources revealed on Monday that the Chadian army opened fire on Sunday on a gathering of Sudanese in the area of um Sissiya, west of the town of um Doukhoun (in the state of Central Darfur), killing five and wounding 14. The town of um Dokhoun is located on the border between Sudan, Chad and the Central African Republic. A local medical source confirmed the information to "Darfur24". Some of the wounded were transferred to the town of Nyala in South Darfur State for treatment due to the seriousness of their condition. An eyewitness, Mustafa Yacoub, told "Darfur24" that a Chadian army unit opened fire on a popular gathering where residents were dancing to celebrate the holiday, in the area of um Sissiya located on the border between the two countries. He added that the army dispersed the rally before shooting at people fleeing towards the border, which caused the death of four people instantly, while a fifth died later after being transferred to hospital, in addition to several wounded, some of them in serious condition. Dozens of people have been arrested by the Chadian army and their fate remains unknown so far.
Clashes between the joint forces, mainly from the Zaghawa community and allied with the Sudanese army, and the Rapid Support Forces (RSF), dominated by the Arab community and close to the Chadian regime, have crossed the border in recent months. Since December, these excesses on Chadian soil have caused 125 deaths among soldiers and civilians.
The bombing of 18 March, which killed 19 people, including a woman and a child, marked a turning point. A drone struck in the heart of Chadian territory. But beyond the numbers, a haunting question remains: who is responsible for this tragedy?
In this climate of deliberately maintained confusion, the Sudanese army accuses the RSF, which blames the regular army, while the joint forces point the finger at the Chadian army. N'Djamena, in a statement, limits itself to warning both sides. Unlike Marshal Mahamat Idriss, the chief of staff of the Chadian army, General Abakar Karankayno, indirectly, pointed to the RSF as responsible for this massacre.
In this game of intersecting accusations, the truth evaporates, but the victims are very real.
To contain the escalation, President Mahamat Idriss Déby Itno, known as "Kaka", sent military reinforcements led by the chief of staff, the minister of defence and the minister of security. The stated objective is to disarm the militias of the two communities present on Chadian soil and which provide direct support to the belligerents.
Witnesses say Chadian soldiers penetrated up to 10 km into Sudanese territory before turning back. The objective is to try to disarm militias operating on the border and create a buffer zone. The Sudanese authorities have not yet reacted to this incursion. But the militiamen close to the joint forces are openly defying N'Djamena by refusing to lay down their arms. Some denounce a conspiracy and accuse the President Kaka of wanting to disarm the Zaghawa militias to facilitate the capture of Tiné by the RSF and open the border to arms and fuel deliveries, the only corridor left for the RSF since the closure of the Libyan border by the "Chamber of Operations for the Liberation of Southern Libya" led by Wardougou.
Internal protests intensified and some Zaghawa, including General Ousman Dillo, publicly called for the overthrow of President Kaka.
Sucked into the Sudanese conflict, is Chad now caught in a geopolitical and community trap? President Kaka's ambiguities, accused in turn of supporting the RSF or turning a blind eye to the involvement of his soldiers alongside the Sudanese army, weaken his position.
The most worrying thing is the ethnic dimension: the conflict is taking a tribal turn, opposing Zaghawa and Arabs, two warrior communities present on both sides of the border. If this logic takes hold, the conflict will cease to be solely military and will become communal, with incalculable regional consequences.
However, Chad risks tipping over into a proxy war, where its villages will become the battlegrounds of foreign interests. Peace and social cohesion, already fragile, could collapse.
The real question is no longer only: who bombed Tine? It is now : how much longer will Chad be able to stand in the middle of this crossfire?
Clashes between the joint forces, mainly from the Zaghawa community and allied with the Sudanese army, and the Rapid Support Forces (RSF), dominated by the Arab community and close to the Chadian regime, have crossed the border in recent months. Since December, these excesses on Chadian soil have caused 125 deaths among soldiers and civilians.
The bombing of 18 March, which killed 19 people, including a woman and a child, marked a turning point. A drone struck in the heart of Chadian territory. But beyond the numbers, a haunting question remains: who is responsible for this tragedy?
In this climate of deliberately maintained confusion, the Sudanese army accuses the RSF, which blames the regular army, while the joint forces point the finger at the Chadian army. N'Djamena, in a statement, limits itself to warning both sides. Unlike Marshal Mahamat Idriss, the chief of staff of the Chadian army, General Abakar Karankayno, indirectly, pointed to the RSF as responsible for this massacre.
In this game of intersecting accusations, the truth evaporates, but the victims are very real.
To contain the escalation, President Mahamat Idriss Déby Itno, known as "Kaka", sent military reinforcements led by the chief of staff, the minister of defence and the minister of security. The stated objective is to disarm the militias of the two communities present on Chadian soil and which provide direct support to the belligerents.
Witnesses say Chadian soldiers penetrated up to 10 km into Sudanese territory before turning back. The objective is to try to disarm militias operating on the border and create a buffer zone. The Sudanese authorities have not yet reacted to this incursion. But the militiamen close to the joint forces are openly defying N'Djamena by refusing to lay down their arms. Some denounce a conspiracy and accuse the President Kaka of wanting to disarm the Zaghawa militias to facilitate the capture of Tiné by the RSF and open the border to arms and fuel deliveries, the only corridor left for the RSF since the closure of the Libyan border by the "Chamber of Operations for the Liberation of Southern Libya" led by Wardougou.
Internal protests intensified and some Zaghawa, including General Ousman Dillo, publicly called for the overthrow of President Kaka.
Sucked into the Sudanese conflict, is Chad now caught in a geopolitical and community trap? President Kaka's ambiguities, accused in turn of supporting the RSF or turning a blind eye to the involvement of his soldiers alongside the Sudanese army, weaken his position.
The most worrying thing is the ethnic dimension: the conflict is taking a tribal turn, opposing Zaghawa and Arabs, two warrior communities present on both sides of the border. If this logic takes hold, the conflict will cease to be solely military and will become communal, with incalculable regional consequences.
However, Chad risks tipping over into a proxy war, where its villages will become the battlegrounds of foreign interests. Peace and social cohesion, already fragile, could collapse.
The real question is no longer only: who bombed Tine? It is now : how much longer will Chad be able to stand in the middle of this crossfire?