1. El-Fasher’s Impact on N’Djamena The capture of El-Fasher, in North Darfur near Sudan’s western border with Chad, by the Rapid Support Forces (RSF), marks a major geopolitical shift. El-Fasher was not only the last major city in Darfur under Sudanese army control, but also the final symbolic stronghold of the Zaghawa tribe, which spans both countries. Its fall sent shockwaves through N’Djamena, threatening border stability and reviving fears of cross-border security repercussions. This upheaval raises the question: must the Chadian regime now abandon its opportunistic stance toward the Sudanese conflict and seek a direct security arrangement with the Sudanese army?
2. Zaghawa Division and the Rise of Rivals
The complex tribal ties between the two countries and the involvement of Chadian citizens in Sudan’s conflict heighten risks for the regime. Loyalties are split: Goran and Arab components fight alongside the RSF, while Zaghawa Chadians support the Sudanese army. This internal fracture further weakens President Mahamat Idriss Déby Itno, himself Zaghawa by his father and Goran by his mother. He is accused by some Zaghawa of undermining their historical influence in El-Fasher, possibly motivated by a desire to break from his father’s legacy, which relied on cross-border Zaghawa armed movements. His perceived favoritism toward the Goran is evidenced by their presence in RSF ranks and suspicions of military supplies from the UAE under humanitarian cover. RSF commanders have openly declared intentions to move toward Chad to seize power, claiming it is time for Chadian Arab components and their Goran allies to govern with support from Sudanese kin and other regional actors.
3–4. Borders on the Brink: All Ingredients for a Chadian Rebellion
The RSF is now the most powerful military actor along Chad’s eastern border, posing an existential threat. History shows that every Darfur conflict has reverberated in N’Djamena. The current scenario includes shifting tribal alliances, rampant smuggling, and signs of complicity from influential Zaghawa figures close to the Goran. Reports indicate Zaghawa soldiers joining their “Toroboro” cousins alongside the Sudanese army. El-Fasher’s fall could establish a de facto governance model in Darfur under Arab armed control, increasing the risk of conflict spilling into Chad—especially in border areas hosting over 1.5 million Sudanese refugees, mostly from tribes hostile to the RSF. The retreat of “Toroboro” fighters into eastern Chad could spark internal clashes. The Sudanese army might also reactivate the Chadian armed opposition. General Ahmat Moufadal, Sudan’s intelligence chief and a seasoned strategist on Chadian affairs, is believed to have orchestrated the 2008 rebel offensive that nearly toppled N’Djamena. Chadian troop movements near the border remain fragile, with exhausted forces and fractured command chains.
5. Opposition Congress in France: A Catalyst for Armed Resurgence
This strategic shift coincides with renewed mobilization of Chadian armed opposition abroad. The FACT movement (Front for Change and Concord in Chad) reemerged as a central actor, uniting political and armed opposition forces at a major gathering in Nantes on October 26, 2025. They pledged to escalate the “struggle to save the homeland” from what they call a “totalitarian dictatorship.” This dynamic could reshape political, military, and media balances—especially if all opposition factions, including the emerging youth-led H23 movement, unite. H23 is known for its activism and demands for justice and inclusive development.
6. Survival Strategy: Cost of Adaptation and the Opposition Card Facing existential threats, Déby’s regime must abandon its “investment in chaos” strategy and adopt a risk-control and regime-consolidation approach. It is in Chad’s interest to halt logistical involvement in Sudan’s conflict to avoid retaliatory blowback and seek reconciliation with the Sudanese army to neutralize the opposition card. This would require urgent negotiations for a political deal involving enhanced security and intelligence cooperation in exchange for halting support to Chadian rebels. The political cost for Déby would be relinquishing regional ambitions in favor of a compromise ensuring regime survival in a fragmented yet influential Sudan. This pragmatic repositioning could elevate him to a privileged mediator role between the RSF and the Sudanese army, bolstering his diplomatic legitimacy.
7. N’Djamena at a Crossroads in a Region in Crisis
El-Fasher’s fall is not merely a military event—it is a geopolitical upheaval with profound implications for Chad’s security and stability. With the RSF’s rise, deepening tribal fractures, and a resurgent armed opposition, Chad faces existential challenges. President Déby’s regime, often cited among Africa’s most corrupt and accused of embezzling over 27 trillion CFA francs (approx. $45 billion) in just three years, is weakened by internal military tensions. In this context, relying on Sudanese chaos is no longer viable. The future of Chad’s regime—and regional stability—depends on N’Djamena’s ability to read this new landscape with clarity and make bold decisions that balance national security with vital economic interests before being swept into a widening transborder conflict.
- Voir la mise en scène de l'arrestation de l'auteur des crimes d'Elfascher Abou Loulou
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