There are moments in war when you do not need a leaked document to understand the politics behind what is happening. Sometimes, all you need to examine is the timing, the actors involved, the evidence already in the public domain, and who stands to benefit.
The latest US proposal at the UN Security Council is one such moment. Washington has proposed extending the existing arms embargo on Darfur to the whole of Sudan, including restrictions covering drones and related military technology. The stated objective is to reduce the flow of weapons and pressure “both sides” toward negotiations.
But after more than three years of war, the battlefield has changed dramatically. The Sudanese Armed Forces have liberated Khartoum and regained large areas of the country. The Rapid Support Forces Militia (RSF) have suffered significant military setbacks and increasing pressure. At precisely this moment, Washington is proposing restrictions that could limit the Sudanese state’s access to weapons, drones, spare parts and military technology.
This raises a simple question: Who stands to benefit from such a measure on the ground? This is where the United Arab Emirates becomes impossible to ignore. A substantial body of international evidence has linked the UAE to military and logistical support for the RSF militia. Amnesty International has identified advanced Chinese weapons in Sudan that it concluded were almost certainly re-exported by the UAE, describing the transfers as violations of the existing Darfur arms embargo. Human Rights Watch has documented Colombian fighters recruited through a UAE-based company who passed through UAE military facilities before being deployed to fight alongside the RSF militia. Reuters has separately investigated aircraft and logistics networks connected to the movement of weapons, drones and fighters supporting the militia.
The evidence, however, raises an obvious question for Washington, London and Paris: if external networks are sustaining the RSF, why is the international response focusing so heavily on restricting the Sudanese state?
When the RSF militia launched its rebellion in April 2023, Khartoum became a battlefield. The militia and allied forces fought in residential neighbourhoods, occupied public institutions, killing civilians, looting public and private properties, committed sexual violence and caused mass displacement. The war spread to Al Jazira, Sennar, White Nile and elsewhere. In Darfur, the international community repeatedly documented atrocities.
Then came El Fasher. After a prolonged siege, the city fell to the RSF militia in October 2025. In July 2026, Amnesty International concluded that the RSF militia had committed crimes against humanity during its campaign and documented evidence of ethnic cleansing around the city. The world knew what was happening. The evidence accumulated. Yet the existing arms embargo on Darfur did not prevent weapons and military equipment from reaching the battlefield. That raises the first great contradiction: if the international community struggled to enforce the existing embargo in Darfur, why should expanding it to the whole country automatically solve the problem? Perhaps the problem has never been simply a lack of sanctions. Perhaps it has been the lack of political will to enforce them against those who violate them.
The real question should therefore be: Where are the weapons coming from, who finances them, who transports them, and who has the political influence to stop them?
If Washington is serious about ending the war, why not target the supply networks sustaining the RSF militia? Why not sanction companies involved in recruiting foreign fighters? Why not disrupt the financial networks and gold trade that help finance the conflict? Why not strengthen international monitoring of the airports and corridors through which weapons enter Darfur?
Instead, Washington has chosen a much broader measure at a time when the military balance has changed. An embargo may be equal on paper but unequal in practice. The Sudanese Armed Forces are a conventional state military dependent on formal procurement, spare parts, ammunition, aircraft and other equipment. The RSF militia has demonstrated its ability to rely heavily on informal external supply networks. Restricting both sides does not necessarily produce neutrality. It can produce very different consequences.
For a militia under military pressure, time can be more valuable than territory. A frozen conflict could give the RSF an opportunity to regroup, rebuild its supply networks, restore its finances and reconstruct its alliances. That does not require Washington to secretly intend to save the RSF militia. A policy can produce consequences very different from its stated objective.
This is also why the UAE’s broader influence matters. Abu Dhabi has developed deep economic and strategic relationships with the United States, Britain and France through investment, ports, energy, infrastructure, trade and security cooperation. There is no need for a secret document proving a direct bargain between Abu Dhabi and Western governments. International politics often operates through converging interests.
The UAE has strategic interests in Sudan and the Red Sea. Western governments have strategic relationships with the UAE. The RSF militia benefits from external support and, above all, from time. Those interests can intersect without anyone explicitly saying: “Save the RSF militia.”
But who benefits if the advance of the Sudanese army is halted? The danger extends beyond the military balance. Preserving the RSF militia as an independent armed force risks creating parallel administrations, war economies and security structures. Sudan does not need a formal declaration of partition to begin fragmenting. Zones of influence can become permanent realities, and permanent realities can eventually become political borders.
That would also have consequences far beyond Sudan. The country sits on one of the world’s most strategically important waterways. Prolonged fragmentation would increase risks to Red Sea security, international shipping, arms trafficking, irregular migration and regional stability.
If Western governments genuinely want to preserve Sudan’s territorial integrity, they should consider whether weakening state institutions while an externally supported militia retains the ability to rebuild is consistent with that objective.
The Security Council should therefore ask a different question. Not simply: Should weapons entering Sudan be stopped? Yes, they should. The real question is: Who is supplying the militia, who finances it, who transports its weapons and fighters, and who has the influence to stop those networks?
If the answers point to external actors, restricting the Sudanese state while those networks remain intact is not a solution. It is a change of target. Washington should pressure every external actor supporting the RSF militia, target the financial networks sustaining the war, sanction companies involved in recruiting mercenaries, monitor the relevant air and land corridors, disrupt the gold networks financing the conflict and protect civilians. At the same time, Sudan’s state institutions must retain the capacity necessary to defend the country’s territorial integrity and restore security.
History will eventually ask not only who committed the atrocities, but who knew, who could have stopped the weapons, who could have pressured the financiers, and who chose not to.
The world has already seen what happened when the RSF militia controlled major population centres. It saw Khartoum. It saw Al Jazira. It saw Darfur. It saw El Fasher.
The question now is not simply why.
It is: whose is benefiting?
If freezing the war gives a militia under military pressure the time to rebuild, and if substantial international evidence identifies external networks supporting that militia, Washington, London and Paris have a responsibility to demonstrate that their policies will not have the effect of preserving the very force they claim they want to disarm.
Peace is not built by keeping a militia alive. Stability is not achieved by freezing a country’s divisions.
If Western governments genuinely want to end Sudan’s war, they should stop asking, “How do we prevent the army from winning?”
They should start asking the question that matters far more:
“How do we prevent the militia from coming back to commit war crimes against men, women and children?”
By: Mohamed Osman Akasha
PhD: International Security
Saving the RSF Militia under the Pretext of Peace - The Brown Land News
The latest US proposal at the UN Security Council is one such moment. Washington has proposed extending the existing arms embargo on Darfur to the whole of Sudan, including restrictions covering drones and related military technology. The stated objective is to reduce the flow of weapons and pressure “both sides” toward negotiations.
But after more than three years of war, the battlefield has changed dramatically. The Sudanese Armed Forces have liberated Khartoum and regained large areas of the country. The Rapid Support Forces Militia (RSF) have suffered significant military setbacks and increasing pressure. At precisely this moment, Washington is proposing restrictions that could limit the Sudanese state’s access to weapons, drones, spare parts and military technology.
This raises a simple question: Who stands to benefit from such a measure on the ground? This is where the United Arab Emirates becomes impossible to ignore. A substantial body of international evidence has linked the UAE to military and logistical support for the RSF militia. Amnesty International has identified advanced Chinese weapons in Sudan that it concluded were almost certainly re-exported by the UAE, describing the transfers as violations of the existing Darfur arms embargo. Human Rights Watch has documented Colombian fighters recruited through a UAE-based company who passed through UAE military facilities before being deployed to fight alongside the RSF militia. Reuters has separately investigated aircraft and logistics networks connected to the movement of weapons, drones and fighters supporting the militia.
The evidence, however, raises an obvious question for Washington, London and Paris: if external networks are sustaining the RSF, why is the international response focusing so heavily on restricting the Sudanese state?
When the RSF militia launched its rebellion in April 2023, Khartoum became a battlefield. The militia and allied forces fought in residential neighbourhoods, occupied public institutions, killing civilians, looting public and private properties, committed sexual violence and caused mass displacement. The war spread to Al Jazira, Sennar, White Nile and elsewhere. In Darfur, the international community repeatedly documented atrocities.
Then came El Fasher. After a prolonged siege, the city fell to the RSF militia in October 2025. In July 2026, Amnesty International concluded that the RSF militia had committed crimes against humanity during its campaign and documented evidence of ethnic cleansing around the city. The world knew what was happening. The evidence accumulated. Yet the existing arms embargo on Darfur did not prevent weapons and military equipment from reaching the battlefield. That raises the first great contradiction: if the international community struggled to enforce the existing embargo in Darfur, why should expanding it to the whole country automatically solve the problem? Perhaps the problem has never been simply a lack of sanctions. Perhaps it has been the lack of political will to enforce them against those who violate them.
The real question should therefore be: Where are the weapons coming from, who finances them, who transports them, and who has the political influence to stop them?
If Washington is serious about ending the war, why not target the supply networks sustaining the RSF militia? Why not sanction companies involved in recruiting foreign fighters? Why not disrupt the financial networks and gold trade that help finance the conflict? Why not strengthen international monitoring of the airports and corridors through which weapons enter Darfur?
Instead, Washington has chosen a much broader measure at a time when the military balance has changed. An embargo may be equal on paper but unequal in practice. The Sudanese Armed Forces are a conventional state military dependent on formal procurement, spare parts, ammunition, aircraft and other equipment. The RSF militia has demonstrated its ability to rely heavily on informal external supply networks. Restricting both sides does not necessarily produce neutrality. It can produce very different consequences.
For a militia under military pressure, time can be more valuable than territory. A frozen conflict could give the RSF an opportunity to regroup, rebuild its supply networks, restore its finances and reconstruct its alliances. That does not require Washington to secretly intend to save the RSF militia. A policy can produce consequences very different from its stated objective.
This is also why the UAE’s broader influence matters. Abu Dhabi has developed deep economic and strategic relationships with the United States, Britain and France through investment, ports, energy, infrastructure, trade and security cooperation. There is no need for a secret document proving a direct bargain between Abu Dhabi and Western governments. International politics often operates through converging interests.
The UAE has strategic interests in Sudan and the Red Sea. Western governments have strategic relationships with the UAE. The RSF militia benefits from external support and, above all, from time. Those interests can intersect without anyone explicitly saying: “Save the RSF militia.”
But who benefits if the advance of the Sudanese army is halted? The danger extends beyond the military balance. Preserving the RSF militia as an independent armed force risks creating parallel administrations, war economies and security structures. Sudan does not need a formal declaration of partition to begin fragmenting. Zones of influence can become permanent realities, and permanent realities can eventually become political borders.
That would also have consequences far beyond Sudan. The country sits on one of the world’s most strategically important waterways. Prolonged fragmentation would increase risks to Red Sea security, international shipping, arms trafficking, irregular migration and regional stability.
If Western governments genuinely want to preserve Sudan’s territorial integrity, they should consider whether weakening state institutions while an externally supported militia retains the ability to rebuild is consistent with that objective.
The Security Council should therefore ask a different question. Not simply: Should weapons entering Sudan be stopped? Yes, they should. The real question is: Who is supplying the militia, who finances it, who transports its weapons and fighters, and who has the influence to stop those networks?
If the answers point to external actors, restricting the Sudanese state while those networks remain intact is not a solution. It is a change of target. Washington should pressure every external actor supporting the RSF militia, target the financial networks sustaining the war, sanction companies involved in recruiting mercenaries, monitor the relevant air and land corridors, disrupt the gold networks financing the conflict and protect civilians. At the same time, Sudan’s state institutions must retain the capacity necessary to defend the country’s territorial integrity and restore security.
History will eventually ask not only who committed the atrocities, but who knew, who could have stopped the weapons, who could have pressured the financiers, and who chose not to.
The world has already seen what happened when the RSF militia controlled major population centres. It saw Khartoum. It saw Al Jazira. It saw Darfur. It saw El Fasher.
The question now is not simply why.
It is: whose is benefiting?
If freezing the war gives a militia under military pressure the time to rebuild, and if substantial international evidence identifies external networks supporting that militia, Washington, London and Paris have a responsibility to demonstrate that their policies will not have the effect of preserving the very force they claim they want to disarm.
Peace is not built by keeping a militia alive. Stability is not achieved by freezing a country’s divisions.
If Western governments genuinely want to end Sudan’s war, they should stop asking, “How do we prevent the army from winning?”
They should start asking the question that matters far more:
“How do we prevent the militia from coming back to commit war crimes against men, women and children?”
By: Mohamed Osman Akasha
PhD: International Security
Saving the RSF Militia under the Pretext of Peace - The Brown Land News