Aux États-Unis, la violence politique est extrêmement asymétrique, mais existe néanmoins sur tout le spectre politique. Des études de la Global Terrorism Database, de Reuters et de l’Institut national de la justice, utilisant différentes méthodologies, confirment toutes que le grand nombre de complots violents, de meurtres et d’attaques idéologiques proviennent de la droite ces dernières années, ciblant non seulement des opposants politiques de gauche mais aussi des politiciens plus modérés de droite. 10 Un nombre beaucoup plus faible de ces attaques sont venues de gauche (et parfois ciblent les modérés de gauche). 11 Les manifestations armées violentes (contre les droits LGBTQ+, par exemple) sont également plus fréquentes à droite, bien que des escarmouches aient aussi lieu à gauche (notamment lors de rassemblements pro-palestiniens et Black Lives Matter), souvent après l’intervention des forces de l’ordre. 12
Finally, there is a portion of the public so disillusioned with “the system,” or in such despair of democracy’s ability to deliver what it desires, that it will justify violence in the name of change. Thus in France, anarchists from outside the party system were major players in the violent yellow-vest protests of 2018–19 and in the 2023 riots. In the United States, the despair and disaffection among the rising generation is perhaps even more worrisome for the future than the polarization and party-catalyzed hate. A recent study found that young people between 18 and 34 are significantly more willing than any other age group to justify killing political officials with whom they disagree, forcibly occupying buildings, harassing opponents online, and armed protest, among other forms of violence and intimidation.13
According to the same study, justifications of violence are strongest from people across all age groups who affiliate with a third party (that is, not Republican or Democratic). Moreover, many who engage in violence seem to forgo peacefully expressing their feelings at the polls: Of the violent protesters arrested in Portland, Oregon, shortly after the 2016 election, for example, at least a third had not voted; another third could not be determined but were not registered in the state.14
To curtail political violence in democracies today, we must begin thinking about it as a problem of democracy itself and to look for lessons from different parts of the world and different moments in time. What can international cases teach us about how to diminish the influence of extremist parties, neutralize the power of polarization, and cultivate hope and belief in the system among the discouraged and dispossessed? Following are five proven pillars.
Leaders must insist on nonviolence. The most direct way to prevent political violence is for politicians, party leaders, and ideologically linked cultural leaders to insist that no one should commit violence — not political leaders, not citizens. This is critical because many more people think that political violence can be justifiable than actually act on it. Thus when leaders make it clear that violence perpetrated by either leaders or citizens will not be pardoned or supported, it diminishes the likelihood that aggressive individuals will act.15
Les dirigeants du parti devraient prendre position contre la violence avant que les politiciens extrémistes ne deviennent des figures importantes, et bloquer l’acceptation par leurs partis des porte-étendards potentiels qui déshumanisent leurs adversaires ou les traitent comme des traîtres. La France et l’Allemagne ont toutes deux maintenu des versions d’un cordon sanitaire pour empêcher l’AfD et le Rassemblement national d’accéder au pouvoir. Cela a probablement réduit la violence globale dans les deux pays (bien qu’en France, la droite se soit scindée lors des élections de 2024, une partie du centre-droit s’alignant sur le Rassemblement national). 16 Dans le système bipartite américain, une mesure équivalente fut le refus des dirigeants du Parti républicain d’adopter la politique nativiste de Pat Buchanan dans les années 1990, ce qui le conduisit finalement à quitter le GOP pour se présenter comme candidat d’un troisième parti. 17
Lorsque les dirigeants dénoncent la violence ou se repentent pour un langage ou des actes violents passés, les partisans suivent le mouvement. Des études montrent qu’un langage plus inclusif venant du sommet réduit les justifications de la violence parmi les adeptes. 18 Inversement, lorsque les politiciens utilisent un langage violent, dépeignent l’opposition comme l’ennemi et ne dénoncent pas clairement la violence contre leurs adversaires politiques, cela enrichit et s’implace dans le mainstream des individus violents qui seraient normalement en marge de la société. 19
Aux États-Unis, le langage toxique des dirigeants invoquant la colère, le mépris et surtout le dégoût — les émotions les plus susceptibles de pousser les autres à la violence — est de plus en plus répandu. Pourtant, d’importants efforts de contre-argumentation sont en cours. La campagne publicitaire Disagree Better, menée par le gouverneur républicain de l’Utah, Spencer Cox, et réunissant des gouverneurs des deux camps s’accordant à être en désaccord civilement, est un exemple de politiciens des deux partis tentant d’établir de nouvelles normes. De nombreux dirigeants de gauche travaillent également à maintenir des normes de non-violence, par exemple, en établissant des distinctions claires entre la lutte légitime du peuple palestinien et l’inacceptabilité de l’antisémitisme et des tactiques violentes des Socialistes démocratiques d’Amérique et d’autres groupes américains ainsi que du Hamas et des organisations terroristes à l’étranger. 20
Les gouvernements et les dirigeants doivent soutenir l’État de droit. Le Quality of Government Institute en Suède a passé des années à étudier à travers l’Europe ce qui instaure la confiance. L’organisation a constaté que la confiance des gens envers le gouvernement grandissait surtout lorsqu’ils estimaient que leurs tribunaux et leur police étaient équitables. Pendant ce temps, les gens se faisaient plus confiance lorsqu’ils croyaient que les tribunaux et la police appliquaient les lois de manière égale entre les groupes sociaux et que ceux qui enfreignaient les lois seraient punis. Montrer que l’État punira les auteurs de violences régulièrement, rapidement et de manière égale, quelle que soit leur idéologie — et qu’il le fera par les tribunaux, et non par la violence policière — est donc essentiel pour instaurer la confiance et freiner la violence politique.
Une étude portant sur Israël, l’Allemagne et les États-Unis a révélé que lorsque les terroristes intérieurs estiment que le gouvernement est idéologiquement de leur côté, ils sont plus enclins à recourir à la violence. 21 D’autres études montrent la même chose pour les auteurs qui estiment que les services de sécurité sont de leur côté. Aux États-Unis, les arrestations massives, enquêtes et poursuites des émeutiers du 6 janvier ont tempéré les conversations violentes sur des sites web extrémistes, alors que des personnes qui auparavant auraient pu applaudir un langage, des idées ou des plans violents exprimaient leur crainte de la surveillance et des sanctions du FBI. 22
En même temps, les forces de police ne doivent pas utiliser une force disproportionnée, et elles doivent surveiller toutes les personnes et les communautés de manière égale et équitable. Une étude sur la violence politique en Allemagne et en Italie durant les turbulentes années 1960 et 1970, alors que les deux pays faisaient face à des groupes terroristes domestiques et subissaient des meurtres politiques, a révélé que la violence était plus intense et dure plus longtemps en Italie car, à chaque instant, la police italienne utilisait une force accrue. 23 De même, le mouvement des milices aux États-Unis s’est développé dans les années 1990 lorsque le gouvernement a utilisé des tactiques de tir à feu à Ruby Ridge, Idaho, et Waco, Texas, mais s’est essoufflé lorsque le gouvernement fédéral a appris à inculper et arrêter des membres de milices illégales tout en empêchant ses propres officiers d’abuser de la violence. La brutalité étatique tend à être le tournant où les personnes avec des griefs commencent à adopter des tactiques violentes. 24
Courts are also critical for upholding the guardrails of democracy. When courts politicize themselves — or when politicians denigrate courts or pledge to pardon their allies — it corrodes public trust in the impartial rule of law. The persistence of election denialism is a particularly pernicious threat, as it undermines faith in the courts as the ultimate arbiter of election-related disputes.
Several ongoing initiatives in the United States, including the Committee for Safe and Secure Elections’ convening of election and law-enforcement officials and the Stavros Niarchos Foundation (SNF) Agora Institute–R Street Institute’s network of Republican leaders, are working to build trust in elections among right-leaning leaders and voters. Building trust in police and courts is more difficult, however, given that the institutions themselves must act to uphold the rule of law equally before trust accrues.25
Les pays doivent modifier les incitations politiques. Les systèmes du gagnant rafle tout — dans lesquels le candidat d’un seul parti remporte le pouvoir sur l’ensemble du district, parfois même en manquant de la majorité — sont particulièrement associés à la violence politique car déplacer seulement quelques électeurs peut entraîner une inclusion totale ou une exclusion du parti du pouvoir. 26 Les systèmes bipartites — qui tendent à résulter de règles du gagnant rafle tout — sont également corrélés à une plus grande violence politique, probablement en raison de leur tendance polarisante. 27 Ces désavantages systémiques sont aggravés par la part importante et croissante de circonscriptions uninominales aux États-Unis qui sont « sûres » (c’est-à-dire essentiellement non compétitives) pour un parti ou l’autre — une situation qui permet aux électeurs plus partisans qui votent lors d’élections primaires à faible participation de choisir effectivement le vainqueur, ce qui conduit des politiciens plus extrêmes à faire campagne de manière plus extrême. Ajoutez à cela un Congrès si étroitement divisé que les bulletins d’un petit nombre d’électeurs dans quelques États et districts peuvent déterminer quel parti contrôle les deux chambres de la législature. En résumé, les États-Unis disposent de structures politiques qui incitent à une approche à somme nulle de la compétition politique et un biais en faveur de la représentation depuis les extrêmes, chacun augmentant la probabilité de violence.
While the United States, Germany, and France all have histories of political violence and have seen political violence rise again in recent years, each element of the American system supercharges these dynamics. Conversely, both France’s multiparty, two-round voting system and Germany’s mixed-member proportional-representation system dampen such dynamics by giving voice to all parties and beliefs across the political spectrum while still allowing for the coalition politics necessary to form a cordon sanitaire against an extremist party or simply to reduce the violent intensity of a duopoly. In Germany, closed party lists that determine more than half the seats in the Bundestag also allow political parties to reduce the potential for extremist individuals to gain seats, since party leaders play a gatekeeping role for those seats. The United States, unique in its binding party-primary elections, has no similar gatekeeping mechanism.28
These structural realities explain why the 1998 Good Friday Agreement established a proportional-representation system for Northern Ireland: The winner-take-all system that existed during the violent Troubles was viewed as having exacerbated the polarization between the republican and loyalist communities. Structures are not cure-alls, however. There are plenty of drawbacks to multiparty systems, and the United States is unlikely to move away from a two-party system any time soon. The country might, however, consider how these lessons could be translated to the U.S. context. For instance, reforms that reduce the outsized power of primary voters, changes that (re)empower political parties to serve as gatekeepers for democracy, ranked-choice voting with instant runoffs that require majorities to win and spur more civil campaigns, and moves toward more proportional forms of representation could reduce the extremism of politicians while enhancing voter representation.
Communities must organize for peace. When politicians inflame polarization and violence in the hopes of building their base and political systems fail to contain the fallout, communities can do more than simply bear the costs. In Kenya, politicians had been using tribal animosities to build their bases since the return of multiparty democracy in the 1990s. The effects of this strategy had been particularly devastating in Wajir County, a rural area in the northeast that borders Ethiopia and Somalia. The county was home to many immigrants who were largely forgotten by the central government, other than when it sent in the military to quell local feuds and cross-border violence, or when politicians ginned up tribal animosity.29
But local activists eventually said enough during the early 1990s, and women organized community groups of local notables to stop the spirals of violence sparked by political rhetoric. Businesses, women’s groups, faith leaders, and other local leaders would meet regularly, building trust among one another and solving problems. It was essential that all these leaders — no matter their tribe or how violent it was or was not — denounce violence from their own group. Only by doing so could they quell reprisals and delegitimize justifications for violence among those demanding revenge. When violence that could potentially be politicized did break out, each of these leaders spoke to their communities to prevent escalation.
Groups such as Over Zero, the Carter Center, and Common Ground USA are introducing similar tactics to the United States, all of which are grounded in these international peacebuilding practices. These organizations are partnering with or helping local groups in multiple U.S. states, such as Idaho Leaders United, to help communities learn to calm violence at the local level.
Activists and political leaders must police their flanks. When activists fighting to change the system insist on change through democratic pathways, and when those overtures yield actual change over time, political violence decreases. But when activists in democracies allow violent elements to dictate actions, those activists tend to lose public support, making violent state responses to civic movements more acceptable to the public and therefore more likely. All this escalates political violence.30 The U.S. civil rights movement, for example, showed how nonviolent protest helped a minority group beset by political violence to achieve democratic gains. Violent protests, however, turned the media and public toward a law-and-order mindset that set back the cause, as recent research has confirmed.31
Activists can work to reduce the chances for violence within their flanks by having clear leadership and cohesion. That type of organization has been out of style among many social-justice activists today, who favor leaderless movements, spontaneous action, and flat hierarchies across organizations. Some activists have also begun to excuse unarmed but aggressive tactics, such as property destruction, road obstruction, and vandalism, as useful to achieving their aims. Yet research clearly shows that armed and violent flanks, even if they can sometimes prove useful, universally make it harder for nonviolent groups to attain their long-term goals.32 Armed flanks also increase the chances of repression from the state, more intense violence, and even civil war.
Meanwhile, some tactics that work in autocracies may backfire in polarized democracies. Most notably, unarmed but aggressive tactics (such as property damage) may help to achieve some intermediate goals (drawing attention to injustice, making more moderate positions more tenable), but will ultimately do more damage to a cause than good.33 Research conducted in the United States and other polarized countries has found that such tactics deepen polarization, increase the vote share for reactionary politicians, and decrease support for positive legislation. And with regard to political violence, unarmed aggressive tactics generally lead to more “intense, enduring, and indiscriminate” state violence wherever they are used.34
Changing Course
America’s political-violence problem is rooted in several mutually reinforcing political problems — deepening polarization, winner-take-all politics, parties’ failure to root out extremist elements, and waning public faith in democratic institutions. The biggest takeaway from international experiences in defusing such violence is that leadership matters: The more that leaders at all levels — from presidents and party leaders, to police chiefs and judges, to activists and community leaders — commit to upholding democratic values, to rejecting violence and antidemocratic, lawless behavior, and to using the tools that democracy provides to reform institutions and inspire hope and attachment to the system, the faster the trend can be reversed.
But to say the influence of all these leaders is equal would be a mistake. Political leaders play outsized roles in shaping public opinion; their words and actions can condone or stoke aggression and violence among their supporters just as easily as they can quell them. When leaders cross the line into antidemocratic or violent behavior, they must be held accountable — in the court of law, in the court of public opinion, and in the history books. Ensuring that this happens demonstrates not only fairness and equality under the law, a key ingredient for building trust, but it also demonstrates what more-responsible leadership looks like. Ultimately, this may be the most important of all the lessons for changing course in the United States.
NOTES
1. “Local Election Officials Survey — May 2024,” Brennan Center for Justice, 1 May 2024, www.brennancenter.org/our-work/research-reports/local-election-officials-survey-may-2024.
2. James A. Piazza, “Political Polarization and Political Violence,” Security Studies 32 (June–July 2023): 476–504; Milan W. Svolik, “Polarization versus Democracy,” Journal of Democracy 30 (July 2019): 20–32.
3. Jack A. Goldstone et al., “A Global Model for Forecasting Political Instability,” American Journal of Political Science 54 (January 2010): 190–208.
4. Piazza, “Political Polarization and Political Violence.”
5. Rachel Kleinfeld, “Polarization, Democracy, and Political Violence in the United States: What the Research Says,” Working Paper (Washington, D.C.: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, September 2023), available at https://carnegieendowment.org/research/2023/09/polarization-democracy-and-political-violence-in-the-united-states-what-the-research-says?lang=en.
6. Rishabh Sharma, “Demo-Crazy: Why West Bengal Sees Blood and Fire Even in Panchayat Polls,” India Today, 28 July 2023, www.indiatoday.in/india/story/west-bengal-panchayat-polls-violence-history-mamata-banerjee-tmc-bjp-cpm-marxists-2406305-2023-07-14; ACLED, “Political Violence and the 2023 Nigerian Election,” 22 February 2023, https://acleddata.com/2023/02/22/political-violence-and-the-2023-nigerian-election/; Michael Wahman, “How Strategic Violence Distorts African Elections,” Journal of Democracy 35 (April 2024): 108–21.
7. Global Project Against Hate and Extremism, “Threats and Violent Attacks by Far-Right Actors on Local Politicians Escalating,” 31 January 2024, https://globalextremism.org/post/threats-violent-attacks-by-far-right-actors-on-local-politicians-escalating/; Global Project Against Hate and Extremism, “Far-Right Hate and Extremist Groups: Germany,” https://globalextremism.org/germany/.
8. Rachel Kleinfeld, “The GOP’s Militia Problem: Proud Boys, Oath Keepers and Lessons from Abroad,” Just Security, 6 July 2022, https://www.justsecurity.org/81898/the-gops-militia-problem-proud-boys-oath-keepers-and-lessons-from-abroad/; Fabiola Cineas, “Donald Trump is the Accelerant,” Vox, 9 January 2021, www.vox.com/21506029/trump-violence-tweets-racist-hate-speech; “Trump Confirms He Would Pardon January 6 Rioters If He Becomes President,” CNN.com, www.cnn.com/2024/07/31/politics/video/january-6-pardon-rioters-donald-trump-nabj-conference-digvid.
9. Global Project Against Hate and Extremism, “Far-Right Political Violence Rising as European Elections Approach,” 5 June 2024, https://globalextremism.org/post/far-right-political-violence-rising-european-elections-approach/; James Angelos, “Attacks on German Politicians Stir Memories of Nazi Past,” Politico Europe, 9 May 2024, www.politico.eu/article/germany-politics-violence-attacks-election/; Andrea Carboni et al., Annual Report on Violence Targeting Local Officials 2023 (Grafton, Wis.: Armed Conflict Location & Event Data [ACLED], 2024), https://acleddata.com/acleddatanew/wp-content/uploads/2024/05/Violence-Targeting-Local-Officials-2023-Report-Final.pdf; Niamh Kennedy and Emma Leyo, “More than 50 Candidates and Campaigners Physically Assaulted Ahead of French Elections,” CNN.com, 5 July 2024, www.cnn.com/2024/07/05/europe/french-elections-political-violence-intl-latam/index.html; John Lichfield, “The Politics of the French Riots,” Politico Europe, 3 July 2023, www.politico.eu/article/france-riots-politics-boy-shot-dead-by-police; Louis Nadau, “Appeler ‘à la justice’ et non ‘au calme’ : pour LFI, ‘la fin justifie les moyens,’” Marianne, 30 June 2023, www.marianne.net/politique/melenchon/appeler-a-la-justice-et-non-au-calme-pour-lfi-la-fin-justifie-les-moyens.
10. Rachel Kleinfeld, “Five Strategies to Support U.S. Democracy,” Working Paper (Washington, D.C.: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, September 2022), available at https://carnegieendowment.org/research/2022/09/five-strategies-to-support-us-democracy?lang=en; Ned Parker and Peter Eisler, “Political Violence in Polarized U.S. at Its Worst Since 1970s,” Reuters, 9 August 2023, www.reuters.com/investigates/special-report/usa-politics-violence/; Steven Chermak et al., “What NIJ Research Tells Us About Domestic Terrorism,” National Institute of Justice Journal, 4 January 2024, https://nij.ojp.gov/topics/articles/what-nij-research-tells-us-about-domestic-terrorism.
11. Dara Lind, “Bernie Sanders Can’t Denounce His Supporters. They’re His Leverage Against the Democrats,” Vox, 18 May 2016, www.vox.com/2016/5/18/11700510/sanders-harassment-supporters-sexism.
12. ACLED, “United States,” https://acleddata.com/united-states-and-canada/usa/.
13. Glocalities, “Growing Despair and Polarization Between Young Women & Men Impacts Elections,” https://glocalities.com/reports/trend-report-polarization; Grayson Wormser, “Data for Democracy: This Month’s Five Key Insights — July 2024,” Data for Democracy, 26 July 2024, https://citizendata.com/report/july-2024-data-for-democracy-political-violence-project-2025/.
14. “Report: Most of Arrested Portland Protestors Didn’t Vote in Oregon,” Kiro7, 15 November 2016, www.kiro7.com/news/local/report-most-of-arrested-portland-protesters-didnt-vote-in-oregon/467507196/.
15. “When Partisans Endorse Violence,” Niskanen Center, 10 February 2021, https://www.niskanencenter.org/when-partisans-endorse-violence/; Kaleigh Rogers, “Why It’s So Hard to Measure Support for Political Violence,” ABC News, 16 July 2024, https://abcnews.go.com/538/hard-measure-support-political-violence/story?id=111991539.
16. Adel Miliani, “Nouvelle amende contre Cyril Hanouna : retrouvez toutes les sanctions de l’Arcom contre C8 et CNews,” Le Monde, 25 July 2024, www.lemonde.fr/les-decodeurs/article/2024/07/25/c8-perd-sa-frequence-sur-la-tnt-retrouvez-toutes-les-sanctions-de-l-arcom-contre-c8-et-cnews_6223105_4355771.html.
17. Thomas B. Edsall, “Buchanan Bolts GOP for Reform Party,” Washington Post, 26 October 1999, https://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/politics/campaigns/wh2000/stories/buchanan102699.htm.
18. Lilliana Mason and Nathan Kalmoe, “How to Prevent a Spiral of Political Violence in America,” Foreign Affairs, 8 August 2024, www.foreignaffairs.com/united-states/how-prevent-spiral-political-violence-america.
19. Marc S. Jacob et al., “Entrepreneurs of Conflict: Media Attention Without Consequences,” OSF Preprints, 10 July 2024, https://osf.io/preprints/osf/754ah.
20. Alex Nguyen, “AOC Slams Pro-Palestine Rally Promoted by Democratic Socialists of America,” Daily Beast, 11 October 2023, www.thedailybeast.com/aoc-slams-democratic-socialists-of-america-for-supporting-pro-palestine-rally.
21. Arie Perliger, “Terror Isn’t Always a Weapon of the Weak — It Can Also Support the Powerful,” Conversation, 28 October 2018, https://theconversation.com/terror-isnt-always-a-weapon-of-the-weak-it-can-also-support-the-powerful-82626.
22. Jared Holt, “Three Narratives Dissuading Pro-Trump Communities from Organizing on Behalf of the Former President,” Institute for Strategic Dialogue, Digital Dispatchesblog, 29 March 2023, www.isdglobal.org/digital_dispatches/three-narratives-dissuading-pro-trump-communities-from-organizing-on-behalf-of-the-former-president/.
23. Donatella della Porta and Mario Diani, Social Movements: An Introduction, 3rd ed. (Hoboken, N.J.: Wiley-Blackwell, 2020).
24. Jeff Goodwin, No Other Way Out: States and Revolutionary Movements, 1945–1991 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001).
25. See https://safeelections.org/ and “Building Trust in Elections,” R Street, www.rstreet.org/home/our-issues/governance/election-trust/.
26. Hanne Fjelde and Kristine Höglund, “Electoral Institutions and Electoral Violence in Sub-Saharan Africa,” British Journal of Political Science 46 (April 2016): 297–320.
27. G. Bingham Powell Jr., “Party Systems and Political System Performance: Voting Participation, Government Stability and Mass Violence in Contemporary Democracies,” American Political Science Review 75 (December 1981): 861–79.
28. John Ishiyama and Ibrahim Shliek, “Rethinking the Relationship Between Inclusive Institutions and Political Violence,” Nationalism and Ethnic Politics 26 (July–September 2020): 240–59.
29. Ken Menkhaus, “Conflict Assessment: Northern Kenya and Somaliland,” Danish Demining Group, February 2015, available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2589109.
30. Amanda Murdie and Carolin Purser, “How Protest Affects Opinions of Peaceful Demonstration and Expression Rights,” Journal of Human Rights 16, no. 3 (2017): 351–69.
31. Omar Wasow, “Agenda Seeding: How 1960s Black Protests Moved Elites, Public Opinion and Voting,” American Political Science Review 114 (August 2020): 638–59; Brent Simpson, Robb Willer, and Matthew Feinberg, “Does Violent Protest Backfire? Testing a Theory of Public Reactions to Activist Violence,” Socius 4 (2018), https://doi.org/10.1177/2378023118803189.
32. Erica Chenoweth, “The Role of Violence in Nonviolent Resistance,” Annual Review of Political Science 26 (June 2023): 55–77.
33. Mohammad Ali Kadivar and Neil Ketchley, “Sticks, Stones, and Molotov Cocktails: Unarmed Collective Violence and Democratization,” Socius 4 (2018), https://doi.org/10.1177/2378023118773614; and Chenoweth, “Role of Violence in Nonviolent Resistance.”
34. Sabine C. Carey, “The Use of Repression as a Response to Domestic Dissent,” Political Studies 58 (February 2010): 167–86; Christian Davenport and Benjamin J. Appel, The Death and Life of State Repression: Understanding Onset, Escalation, Termination, and Recurrence (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2022).
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